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CHAPTER 6 
Obedience and Personal Responsibility 
George R. Mastroianni, Susann Kimmelman, Joe Doty, and 
Joseph J. Thomas 
D angerous contexts are those in which the stakes are high and where there may be little time to develop or discuss a course 
of action. Unquestioning and immediate obedience may be 
demanded precisely because deliberating or discussing might 
delay responding and thereby increase danger or decrease chances of survival. 
In some cases, there may be time for deliberation and discussion, even if there 
is pressure to act quickly. Reaching the right conclusions when the chips are 
down can be facilitated by having considered in advance one's obligation to 
obey an order versus responsibility to oneself, one's values, and others who 
may be affected by actions taken. This chapter considers legal constraints on 
behavior and scientific evidence that helps frame thinking about the pressures 
people may face and how to resist them. Two fictitious scenarios are used to 
illustrate the application of these considerations in practice. 
You are a first-line leader responsible for a small detention facility in a 
remote area of a combat zone where detainees are housed for short peri-
ods of time. The detainees are a mixed group who have been jailed for a 
variety of reasons and consist of a mixture of hard-core insurgents, inno-
cent civilians, common criminals, and foreign fighters. Detainees are inter-
rogated by intelligence personnel to determine whether they should be 
released or transferred to a larger facility. Your job is to administer the facil-
ity, ensuring that the detainees are adequately provided with the necessi-
ties of life, providing for internal and external security, and coordinating 
and cooperating with the intelligence personnel conducting interrogations 
to provide safe access to inmates as needed. 
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Your soldiers notice that detainees are returning from interrogations 
showing signs of physical abuse. The soldiers also report that some of the 
detainees have told them stories of abusive treatment during the interro-
gations. You approach your contact among the interrogators, the official to 
whom detainees are delivered for interrogation, and relay what you have 
heard. He says,"It's none of your business what goes on in the interroga-
tions.Your job is to provide a safe environment to interrogate the detainees 
and to keep your mouth shut. The insurgents are trained to lie about their 
treatment, and by passing on their lies you are only helping the bad guys, 
who are killing your own soldiers." 
For the next few days, you personally escort some of the detainees from 
interrogations and see firsthand the signs of abuse that the soldiers had 
reported. You approach your commander to report what you have seen,You 
tell him that you do not think your unit should be a party to abusive treat-
ment and ask him to clarify with the intelligence authorities what is tak-
ing place during the interrogations. He responds that he has "no authority 
over the intelligence authorities," and even if he did, he would not tell them 
how to do their job. He adds/The detainees are the same people who kill 
and wound our soldiers, and you should reconsider your priorities out here 
in the combat zone. If you care more about these scumbags than your own 
comrades, I have no use for you and will send you packing." He says you 
should "grow up, shut up and get back to work." 
You are deeply conflicted about what to do.You do not think it is right 
to abuse detainees, especially when many of them may be innocent of any 
wrongdOing. You are pretty sure that the rules prohibit the kind of treat-
ment you suspect the detainees are receiving, though the rules are com-
plicated and this is not your area of specialty. You have also seen the results 
of insurgent activity and have lost soldiers to insurgent attacks, including a 
close friend who died the preceding week. You do not want to betray your 
comrades or dishonor the memory of your friend by being soft on detain-
ees, none of whom seem to care much for you or your people anyway. 
You think that you should tell your commander that you are going 
to report your suspicions up the chain of command despite his instruc-
tion to" shut up" and let the chips fall where they may. Your close friends 
in the unit tell you that you would only be sacrificing your own career and 
future for a bunch of people who would abuse you far worse if they had the 
chance. What do you do? 
ABU GHRAIB, 2003 
The above scenario is fictitious, but contains elements of realities that have 
played out many times in recent years. One real-world event, the abuses that 
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took place at Abu Ghraib in fall 2003, has some important parallels with the 
fictitious scenario here. At Abu Ghraib, a military police unit was given the 
responsibility of administering a large prison outside Baghdad. This reserve 
unit was poorly trained, poorly equipped, and poorly supplied. Their living 
conditions and security were abysmal. The prison was overcrowded, leader-
ship was largely absent or ineffective, and the chain of command and respon-
sibility was convoluted.1 
Into this situation stepped a cast of infamous characters: Specialist Charles 
Graner would become known as the ringleader of a group of soldiers whose 
degrading and disgusting treatment of detainees caused worldwide revul-
sion. Staff Sergeant Ivan Frederick, Specialist Megan Ambuhl, and Private 
First Class Lynndie England (among others) went along and participated 
in the abuse. Graner pushed them to cooperate in the abuse by convincing 
them that they were simply doing what intelligence personnel wanted them 
to do-" softening up" the detainees for interrogation. One soldier, Specialist 
Matt Wisdom, walked off the tier when he saw the abuses and immediately 
reported them to his sergeant. Another, Sergeant Joseph Darby, became aware 
of the abuses, could not reconcile them with his values and beliefs, and even-
tually reported them up the chain. Abu Ghraib became a symbol of all the 
things that were wrong with the Iraq War, a rallying cry for opposition to the 
war, and most significant, a recruiting tool for insurgents. Abu Ghraib was also 
only the latest incident in which soldiers accused of misconduct claimed that 
they were "only following orders." 
SETTING THE STAGE: OBEDIENCE AND LEADERSHIP 
Dangerous situations are ones in which, by definition, the stakes are high, and 
are also often situations in which there is not a great deal of time for reflection 
or discussion. Many assume that military culture requires unquestioning and 
immediate obedience to orders from above, and that a similar approach would 
be required in other dangerous situations outside the military. The reality is 
more complicated: wise leaders consult others as they develop their plans, 
and incorporate the advice and experience superiors, peers, and subordinates 
bring to the table. 
Plan Inclusively, Discuss Openly and Honestly, Salute Smartly 
Some outside military culture are surprised to learn that there is more to mili-
tary life than simply transmitting orders up and down a chain of command 
and closely supervising their execution. Orders within the military are based 
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on what is called the commander's intent. It comes from the senior leader and 
articulates the overall plan and end-state of a military operation. Before orders 
are issued, they are usually subjected to a great deal of discussion and some-
times quite lively debate. These discussions generally include individuals at 
various levels in the chain of command. This deliberative and reflective com-
ponent to decision making is essential to ensure that the valuable experience 
of everyone is brought to bear on what are often life-or-death decisions. 
The context in which this deliberation and reflection occur consists of a 
clear and formal hierarchy of relationships. As a result, it can be a challenge 
for military leaders to ensure that their subordinates feel comfortable express-
ing their views, especially when they differ from a superior's. This is, in princi-
ple, no different from what happens in nonmilitary contexts; it is simply more 
public. One important aspect of military culture is that once a course of action 
is decided upon, debate and discussion cease, and universal commitment to 
the successful execution of the plan is expected. It is at this point that the reali-
ties of military life most closely match widely held beliefs about it. 
It Is Our Duty and Personal Responsibility to Disobey Unlawful Orders 
During the execution of military operations, a legal obligation remains for ser-
vice members to disobey orders under certain circumstances. Specifically, sol-
diers are required and expected to challenge and disobey unlawful orders and 
are morally obligated to do so by the terms of their oath. "I was only follow-
ing orders" is not a valid defense for a military member charged with criminal 
conduct. This requirement places an immense burden on them. If a service 
member judges an order to be unlawful and disobeys it, and it is later deter-
mined that the order was lawful, he or she may be subject to severe sanctions 
(including court-martial), especially if the incident takes place under combat 
conditions. On the other hand, a soldier who obeys an unlawful order and 
commits a criminal act is subject to the full weight of the law for any offense 
committed, as if the order had never been given.2 
Regardless of whether legal consequences ensue from following an 
unlawful order, soldiers often experience devastating psychological con-
sequences as they confront doubt or guilt about their actions; such feelings 
sometimes haunt them for the rest of their lives. For example, in March 1968, 
Varnado Simpson took part in the My Lai massacre. "That day in My Lai, I was 
personally responsible for killing about 25 people. Personally. Men, women. 
From shooting them, to cutting their throats, scalping them, to ... cutting off 
their hands and cutting out their tongue."3 Since then, Simpson has suffered 
"chronic and very severe" emotional and psychological trauma. Although we 
Obedience and Personal Responsibility 101 
can discuss these topics in a rational and dispassionate way, the fact is that real 
people may suffer real consequences as a result of their decisions and actions. 
Model and Teach Professional Ethical Codes 
These potentially conflicting obligations are perhaps more starkly apparent in 
military service than in other walks of life, but as John Kleinig argues in The 
Ethics of Policing,4 the ethical tensions that exist in some professions are no 
different in principle from those in most people's everyday lives. These ten-
sions often arise as universal moral obligations seemingly come into conflict 
with certain obligations assumed as professionals. Soldiers, firefighters, police 
officers, and medical professionals may have particular obligations that differ 
by the nature of their profession. Soldiers do not often worry about confiden-
tiality issues, for example, while physicians may. Everyone, however, experi-
ences conflicts from time to time and must be guided in their resolution by 
the requirements of law and the dictates of conscience. Complicating mat-
ters, law and conscience may not always coincide. For instance, medical pro-
fessionals sometimes experience conflicts between professional ethical and 
personal religious obligations. The resolution of such conflicts depends on the 
priority individuals give to the competing obligations. In general, profession-
als agree to abide by the ethical code of their field. This can be problematic if 
the individual is new to the profession or is unfamiliar with the relevant code 
of conduct. 
Loyalty to the Organization Comes before Loyalty to Peers 
The attachments that form between and among those who share life-and-
death experiences are emotionally and psychologically powerful, whether 
such events occur on the battlefield, in an urban back alley, or in a triage tent. 
These attachments complicate the purely rational processing of events and 
add a layer of complexity to the ethical decision making prominent in danger-
ous environments. Indeed, it has been said that soldiers do not fight for their 
country or for abstract ideals; rather they fight for one another.5 Soldiers and 
leaders occupy organizational and social roles, and their inclinations as indi-
viduals may not always correspond with their inclinations as commanders or 
comrades. Exposure to common dangers and hardships binds people in ways 
that outsiders may not fully appreciate. Moreover, those bonds can become 
so strong that horizontal allegiances (those within the unit) may overpower 
or replace vertical allegiances to the overall organization or to superordinate 
entities, such as the society of which the organization is a part. In law enforce-
ment, the popular term "blue wall of silence" refers to the unwritten rule that 
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police officers protect one another from the consequences of improper or ille-
gal activity. When such behavior occurs, it can corrode public trust and under-
mine effectiveness. 
Commitment to organizational values is further complicated when mem-
bers are expected to accept values that they may not endorse or may even 
oppose. There may well be political and ideological differences between most 
members of an organization and the society it serves. The case has been made 
by some that this is the situation with today's U.S. military. Duncan Hunter, 
a former congressional representative from California, has suggested that 
the military's" don't ask, don't tell" policy should not be repealed because the 
members of the military are generally conservative and should not have values 
with which they disagree imposed on them, even if they directly conflict with 
those of the broader society.6 It is the leader's job to ensure that subordinates 
understand their obligations and are ready to live up to them even if they dis-
agree with them or feel conflicting obligations to others around them. Leaders 
may, therefore, find themselves in the uncomfortable position of seemingly 
taking sides with "outsiders" against the members of his or her own unit. 
Leaders must ultimately remain focused on the society they agreed to serve. 
The Law 
The u.s. military justice system, the Uniform Code of Military Justice, is 
administered by service members who are all subject to the system and who 
can be expected to have experienced or to have knowledge of the very dilem-
mas and conflicts that confront individuals charged with unlawful conduct. 
Soldiers should thus expect that they will be judged by people who under-
stand and can empathize with the challenges they face and the conditions 
under which important and morally ambiguous decisions must often be 
made. Military law comes down squarely on the side of personal account-
ability when obedience to orders may place a service member in jeopardy of 
committing criminal conduct. The reality for service members is thus far more 
complex than the view that simple unquestioning obedience is their only obli-
gation. If only it were so simple. 
Organizational Watchdog Agencies 
These conflicting obligations similarly afflict police officers, firefighters, and 
medical personnel, where potential violations will be adjudicated in civil 
courts. Government entities generally have self-policing and enforcement 
mechanisms; for example, police departments have internal affairs bureaus 
that investigate allegations of corruption or misconduct by members. Those 
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that do not have their own internal investigative groups will often rely on the 
district attorney's office or higher levels of government to perform this func-
tion. Inspector general offices have related responsibilities. Judgment is also 
sometimes sought through the courts. Challenges to the propriety of orders or 
refusing to follow orders can be decided through the judicial system, and com-
pensation for right and wrong can be awarded through torts in civil courts. 
The potential conflict between one's personal responsibility to the law 
and one's legal responsibility to obey orders is one which most service mem-
bers will hopefully never experience. If, however, such a conflict arises, it is 
likely to be because of ambiguous circumstances, perhaps in a gray area with 
which the member may have no previous experience, often under conditions 
of extreme stress, fear, and fatigue and with little time to choose between right 
and wrong. These conditions are essentially those that the unlucky soldier 
in the opening scenario faced and also those with which the soldiers at Abu 
Ghraib had to contend. 
When it comes to leadership in dangerous situations, the questions with 
which one must grapple with respect to obedience and personal responsibil-
ity are as follows: (1) How can one develop and sustain a leadership climate 
that encourages soldiers, police officers, and other first responders to think 
through the difficult moral and ethical challenges they may face? (2) What 
training and education can be provided to equip them for morally ambiguous 
situations in combat and elsewhere? (3) What special considerations, if any, do 
dangerous contexts compel one to consider when thinking about obedience 
and personal responsibility? 
NEW HAVEN, 1961 
Forty-two years before Abu Ghraib, in a psychology laboratory at Yale Univer-
sity in New Haven, Connecticut, an interesting scenario played out. Citizens 
answered an ad in a local newspaper to participate in a psychological experi-
ment in return for a small payment. As instructed, they went to a laboratory at 
Yale University and were greeted by a scientist (the" experimenter") wearing 
a white lab coat. He told them that they would be participating in a learning 
study and that they would be the "teachers." They were introduced to a jolly, 
portly gentleman who was identified as the "learner." They were then taken to 
an adjacent room, where the learner was strapped into a chair, with one arm 
bound to a metal plate; the door was closed behind them. They then returned 
to the outer room, where they were seated in front of an ominous-looking con-
sole labeled "Shock Generator." Rows of toggle switches indicated voltage lev-
els. The highest, labeled 450 volts, was marked "Danger: Severe Shock." 
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A teacher was instructed to read through a long list of word pairs, which 
the learner was supposed to memorize. When the teacher re-read the first 
word in the pair, the learner was supposed to provide the second one. If he 
failed, the teacher would deliver a shock. Each successive error raised the 
level of the shock. The "teachers" were actually the only subjects in the study; 
the "learner" received no shocks, but the teacher did not know this until the 
experiment was over. 
Stanley Milgram, the psychologist who conducted this study, found 
that about two-thirds of the teachers (in the most well-known version of 
the study) administered the (supposedly) maximum and dangerously severe 
450-volt shock to the leamer, despite his (faked) screams, objections, med-
ical complaints, and eventual apparent collapse. Many of the teachers were 
uncomfortable with what they were doing. They frequently turned to the 
experimenter for reassurance, often asserting that "they would not accept 
responsibility" for any harm done to the learner, sometimes requiring such 
gentle prodding from the experimenter as "The experiment requires that you 
continue." Nevertheless, under certain combinations of conditions, many of 
the subjects showed a kind of pathological obedience, obeying instructions 
they ought to have refused.7 
From New Haven to the Nazis 
The Milgram obedience study, as this experiment came to be known, 
occurred sixteen years after the end of World War II, at about the time Adolph 
Eichmann, a Nazi war criminal, was captured and subsequently prosecuted in 
Israel. Milgram, while reading Hannah Arendt's riveting account of the trial in 
Eichmann in Jerusalem, was struck by Eichmann's sheer ordinariness.s Arendt 
coined the term "banality of evil" to describe the completely unexceptional 
nature of people who nonetheless commit exceptional acts of what most 
would consider to be evil. Lieutenant William Calley, found guilty of person-
ally murdering numerous defenseless civilians during the My Lai massacre, 
was judged by doctors and psychiatrists to be "normal" and capable of distin-
guishing between right and wrong.9 The subjects in Milgram's study were also 
unexceptional people, who he showed were ready to apply dangerous shocks 
to perfect strangers merely on the say-so of a man in a lab coat. Although the 
Nazis were seen by many as evil, Milgram raised the possibility that they were 
really little different from anyone else. 
As Milgram studied obedience in the laboratory more extensively and 
thoroughly, he began to uncover factors that systematically affected it. For 
example, he found that the closer in physical proximity a "teacher" was to a 
"learner," the less likely the teacher was to administer intense shocks; it is 
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easier to harm someone from a distance than it is to harm someone nearby 
because one does not have to witness the victim's suffering. He also found 
that if the teacher is accompanied by other people who join him or her in 
resisting the experimenter's instructions to apply shocks, compliance with the 
orders is much reduced. 
Milgram began to see an important, but disturbing implication: evil may 
not, as had been traditionally thought, be the result of bad individuals, but 
instead might be the product of bad situations. Any person thrust into such a 
circumstance might be induced by these forces to commit acts that he or she 
would otherwise condemn. This perspective turned on its head much of the 
conventional wisdom about human nature. Milgram's situationist perspec-
tive raised the possibility that people's self-described values might not have 
much to do with their actual behavior-that is, whatever people think about 
humans as moral beings, their conduct is heavily influenced and affected by 
external factors and contextual variables. As a result, it is up to individuals to 
be aware of these factors and resist them.10 
Other researchers began studying these situational pressures in more 
detail, especially in the context of obedient behavior that unfolds over lon-
ger periods of time than the few hours it took for Milgram's subjects to be 
influenced. Milgram's systematic studies of obedience, coupled with extensive 
research by others in the years following the initial publication of the obedi-
ence studies, have produced a picture of the processes that can condition peo-
ple who may think of themselves as compassionate and ethical to behave in 
ways that others might consider to be reprehensible. Researchers have identi-
fied such mechanisms as authorization, routinization, dehumanization, moral 
disengagement, bracketed morality, and transfer of responsibility to help 
explain how situational pressures can affect behavior toward others,u 
Authorization is the perception that a particular behavior has been sanc-
tioned or approved by a higher authority. At Abu Chraib, for example, some 
of the soldiers who carried out the abuses reported that Craner had told them 
that he was acting on the instructions of military intelligence officials, who 
wanted him to II soften up" detainees for interrogation. Some of them had con-
cerns and reservations about the abuses they were committing, but apparently 
convinced themselves that their behavior was acceptable because it had been 
authorized by higher-ups. Some careful thinking might have saved these sol-
diers a great deal of trouble. 
Routinization occurs when people are gradually acculturated to commit 
abuses against others. For example, a soldier might arrive in a combat zone 
never having heard Middle Easterners referred to by any of the variety of pejo-
rative terms soldiers sometimes use to refer to indigenous peoples in that part 
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of the world. He or she may resist the use of such terms at first, but then hear 
them used so often that he or she may begin to use them as well. Increasingly 
routine behaviors can also escalate into abuse, often without conscious aware-
ness of such a dramatic shift. Colonel H. R. McMaster, as commander of the 
3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment in Iraq, prohibited his soldiers from using 
pejorative terms to refer to Iraqis in order to counter these kinds of effectsP 
An important element in the process of acculturating someone to abuse 
others is dehumanization. Most people feel certain obligations toward other 
humans simply by virtue of their being human: people deserve respect and 
dignity and to be treated according to a set of more or less universal standards 
of respect. This commitment to respecting others must be overcome if abuse 
FIGURE 6.1 A propaganda poster from World War I depicting German soldiers as 
inhuman, green-eyed monsters. Credit: F. Strothmann. 
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is to take place, and one way to do that is to categorize people as being some-
thing other than human. War propaganda throughout history has purposely 
dehumanized the enemy to facilitate their killing by armies composed of sol-
diers who may have little inclination to kill otherwise.B 
Law enforcement personnel are not immune from these tendencies; 
referring to suspects as "perps" (perpetrators) and to the "perp walk" can have 
a dehumanizing effect, implying that perps are somehow different from the 
rest of us, and perhaps therefore making it easier to slip into disrespectful or 
even abusive behavior toward them. Prejudice is a preconceived evaluation, a 
judgment made without evidence. Such judgments are often applied to group 
members based solely on a perceived group identity, not on an assessment 
of the individual as an individual. Group prejudice is by its nature a categori-
cal phenomenon, and anything that blinds one to individual characteristics 
and instead emphasizes group identity has the potential to lead to prejudice. 
Emergency medical personnel may sometimes use terms, such as" gomer" 
(Get Out Of My Emergency Room), to disparagingly refer to patients who 
they feel should not be receiving treatment or other terms that deflect atten-
tion away from the individual's particular needs and circumstances. 
Albert Bandura theorized that individuals may slide into "wrong" or 
inappropriate behavior as a result of moral disengagement, which can be a 
by-product of physical, mental, or emotional exhaustion.14 Moral disengage-
ment may be related to the occurrence of so-called repressive coping, in which 
autonomic and emotional responses to stressful situations diverge. Is When 
people are under a great deal of stress, their emotional response may shut 
down, making it harder for them to formulate good decisions, especially when 
their feelings or those of others are an important element of the decision-
making process, as seems to be the case in ethical decision making. 
"Bracketed morality" is a term that derives from an old military cliche: 
"What goes on IDY, stays on IDY" (temporary duty away from home). Some 
members of the military believe that they can (and should) act one way while 
at home station and act another way in a combat zone. This kind of compart-
mentalization is facilitated by dramatic differences in contextual cues that exist 
in different settings. These cues can be physical and environmental or social 
and organizational. Maintaining moral continuity with what was referred to 
during the Vietnam War as "the World" can be challenging. 
The Milgram obedience study has had an immeasurable impact on 
the way researchers think about obedience. It was dramatic, and the results 
were shocking. Milgram's study was also important because its application 
of rigorous experimental methods to a problem that had previously been 
addressed mainly as a philosophical or ethical question powerfully influenced 
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subsequent thinking about the behavior examined, The situationist perspec-
tive, perhaps best represented by this study, emphasizes the role of contextual 
factors in shaping behavior in ethically charged situations. This is not, how-
ever, the only theoretical framework through which one can consider these 
important issues. 
PALO ALTO, 1971 
Another example of the situationist perspective is the Stanford prison study. 
While this perspective adds little or nothing conceptually to Milgram's more 
rigorous and nuanced analysis, it is important to discuss because so much 
has been made of it in trying to explain the real-world abuses at Abu Ghraib 
(that resemble the opening scenario). The Stanford study, conducted by Phillip 
Zimbardo, was designed to demonstrate Zimbardo's view of what happens 
when people are given power but are not constrained in their exercise of it. 
Would people remain faithful to their values or would they succumb to the 
same kinds of behavior observed in the Milgram study, in which ordinary 
people quite readily acted to harm perfect strangers? Are there situations-
as opposed to people-that can compel individuals, or at the very least tempt 
them, to behave badly? If so, what factors make them more likely to "obey" the 
dictates of the situation? What factors will help them resist those dictates?16 
The Stanford prison study was ostensibly designed to simulate prison 
conditions. A group of college students were enrolled in the study and then 
randomly assigned to be either guards or prisoners. Those selected to be 
prisoners were picked up and brought to a simulated jail in the basement of 
the Stanford University psychology department building by Palo Alto police 
officers. Those assigned as guards were given free rein by the "warden," 
Professor Zimbardo. 
The study was supposed to last weeks, but it was prematurely termi-
nated after only a few days because the behavior of some of the participants 
quickly degenerated. Some of the guards became abusive, some of the prison-
ers became submissive, and the warden could not effectively exert influence 
to improve the situation; in fact, he may have perhaps exacerbated it. Some of 
the abuses devised by the guards included putting pillowcases over the heads 
of prisoners who were forced to wear hospital johnny coats, creating a visual 
effect that would bear a striking resemblance to some of the photos from 
Abu Ghraib. Zimbardo interpreted the results as showing that unrestrained 
authority inevitably leads to abuse and violence. For Zimbardo, evil does not 
arise because of bad individuals-a few "bad apples" in the much-abused 
metaphor but rather, evil arises because of "bad barrels." 
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In Zimbardo's view, it is the situation-prison and war are two such situa-
tions he identifies as "bad barrels" -that produces bad behavior, not the indi-
viduals. According to him,"The barrel corrupts anything it touches." This is the 
extreme situationist view, which denies any or much of a role for free will and 
sees behavior as largely determined by external forcesY 
Unlike the Milgram obedience studies, which were carefully conducted 
experiments, the Stanford prison study was little more than a dramatic dem-
onstration orchestrated by Zimbardo to illustrate his viewpoint on authority. 
Despite its lack of scientific rigor, the study has been relentlessly promoted 
and is well known to anyone who has taken an introductory psychology class. 
Zimbardo quickly seized on the superficial similarity between the Abu Ghraib 
photos and the photos from his study to claim that events at Abu Ghraib were 
an example of the kind of behavior he had observed. He offered an analy-
sis intended to exculpate the soldiers who had committed the abuses and 
instead focused responsibility on high-level generals and government officials 
for having created the environment that led to the abuses. Zimbardo testified 
for the defense in the trial of Staff Sergeant Ivan Frederick, one of the soldiers 
accused of committing abuses, arguing that" the Army should be on trial," not 
Frederick. Ultimately, Frederick and others with a direct role in the criminal 
events at Abu Ghraib were convicted of crimes, while several higher-ranking 
officers (in one case, a brigadier general) were fined, reduced in rank, or sub-
jected to career-ending administrative discipline. The excuse of "simply follow-
ing orders" rang as hollow in the wake of Abu Ghraib as it had at Nuremberg. 
BEYOND SITUATIONS 
The Milgram and Zimbardo studies are often raised in discussions of real or 
suspected pathological obedience, where people obey instructions that oth-
ers (and often the people involved, upon reflection) think should have been 
disobeyed. Mechanisms such as authorization, routinization, dehumanization, 
disqualification, moral disengagement, and bracketed morality can predis-
pose soldiers in a unit toward pathological obedience or simply toward ethical 
lapses if they are present. Leaders must be aware of the situational pressures 
identified by Milgram and others in his tradition and must ensure that such 
conditions do not occur in their units. 
Most people do not accept the idea that human behavior is primar-
ily determined externally, by the situations encountered. Most think that 
thoughts, beliefs, and values guide individuals' actions. Those thoughts, beliefs, 
and values are a joint product of biological, psychological, and cultural and 
social factors. People have a lifetime to refine these thoughts and values, to 
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develop cognitive schemas or internal scripts governing various situations and 
challenges. These internal, largely cognitive structures must still be translated 
into action, into behavior, at the moment of decision. Insofar as leaders need 
to help shape the internal discussion that soldiers have with themselves when 
confronted with difficult choices, they must understand and engage soldiers in 
a meaningful dialogue on these complicated issues, so that they have a set of 
internal structures that are likely to yield the "right" answer when queried. The 
leader must engage subordinates at the level of character; he or she must help 
others develop and refine their moral compass. 
Leaders must also help ensure that appropriate impulses are the ones 
that get translated into action at the moment of decision. One way to think 
about this is to remember that situational factors are especially good at get-
ting people to act" out of character," especially in unusual situations that they 
have not had time to reflect on or integrate into their cognitive schemas. 
Milgram's subjects were deeply conflicted even as they pressed the buttons 
to shock the leamer. Staff Sergeant Frederick, reflecting on his actions at Abu 
Chraib, thought that he" should have been stronger" and resisted Craner more 
effectively. Leaders must engage subordinates in the context of the situation, 
making them aware of the situational factors that can temporarily throw the 
needle of their moral compass out of whack. 
DEVELOPING AND SUSTAINING THE RIGHT LEADERSHIP CLIMATE 
Leaders at all levels have a responsibility to develop and build character in 
their subordinates. "Character" is a term that means different things to differ-
ent people. Some consider it to be nothing more than a pattern of relatively 
consistent behavior across situations; for others, it represents a set of inter-
nal, mental, or cognitive attributes that we use to guide behavior. Whatever it 
"really"is, most think we know what it is when we see it, and we know that 
sometimes we do, or see others do, things that are "out of character." Whatever 
one thinks about" character," there are actions that leaders can take that will 
help members of an organization develop their own moral compass and fol-
low the needle no matter what. 
Education on Standards of Conduct 
Leaders are not required to decide independently what behavior is good and 
what is bad. Military services, police and fire departments, and most other 
organizations have generally spent a great deal of effort spelling out in detail 
which behaviors are permitted, and which are not. Ensuring that subordinates 
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are aware of the rules is the first step. In the military, there are requirements 
for periodic training on such topics as the Code of Conduct and the Law of 
Armed Conflict that offers opportunities to reinforce the normative foun-
dation for correct behavior. The Law Enforcement Code of Ethics and the 
Hippocratic Oath spell out basic ethical standards in the fields of law enforce-
ment and medicine, respectively.18 
Be a Role Model and a Coach 
If a particular eventuality can be anticipated and a correct response prescribed, 
then a leader needs simply to ensure that subordinates are aware of that 
response. Because organizations cannot anticipate every eventuality, how-
ever, they usually articulate general principles to govern conduct in novel or 
unique instances. The leader's role then becomes more challenging, as he or 
she must help the subordinate learn to apply these rules correctly to new sets 
of circumstances. Leaders are most effective at this when they function first as 
exemplars or role models, actually demonstrating the desired behaviors. Next 
they must encourage that type of behavior in subordinates by guiding them as 
mentors or coaches rather than as instructors passing on factual knowledge. 
Train and Educate for Moral Ambiguity 
As coaches, leaders can use so-called dilemma training to pose challenging 
scenarios that do not have a" school solution." By analyzing and evaluating 
the reasoning process applied by subordinates, leaders can help them hone 
their skills at recognizing the relevant features of scenarios and applying the 
principles correctly. Leaders can coach subordinates through different "lenses" 
(rules, outcomes, and values) in analyzing dilemmas. Many leaders are famil-
iar with the concept of recognition-primed decision making.19 Good decision 
making hinges on correctly perceiving a situation, because errors often take 
the form of doing the right thing at the wrong time-that is, thinking that one 
is in situation A, and applying response A, when one is really in situation B. 
The phrase"fog of war" captures this kind of confusion. Dilemma training can 
be an effective way to train people to look for and recognize the relevant fea-
tures of situations, ignore distracting features that do not contribute to deter-
mining a correct solution, and respond quickly and correctly. 
Character Development Requires Investment 
Leaders must avoid a checklist or rote memory technique for developing char-
acter. Having people simply memorize and recite the seven Army Values or 
quizzing them on the Law Enforcement Code of Ethics or the Hippocratic 
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Oath is not an effective method of developing character.2°This technique may 
even be counterproductive if the leader and the subordinate think they really 
are accomplishing something. Leaders must approach character development 
in a holistic manner with an understanding that a person's character is con-
stantly being molded and shaped. 
CHALLENGING ASPECTS OF DANGEROUS SITUATIONS 
There are classes of people and situations to which the unusual conditions 
found in the Milgram studies are especially relevant. Military personnel are 
indeed people who may be exposed to situations not unlike the Milgram study. 
Abu Ghraib did contain some (though not all) of the elements of the Milgram 
situation. The night shift was isolated from the outside world, and the abuses 
asked of the soldiers were heinous and inhuman, but not fatal: detainees were 
not regularly subjected to extreme physical torture or killed. Graner served in 
the role of the experimenter, egging on the others, but even he had to invoke 
the unfamiliar authority of the military intelligence authorities to clinch the 
deal with some of the soldiers. Several of the soldiers involved referred to the 
social pressures to which they reluctantly succumbed. 
In fact, the Milgram and Zimbardo studies both occurred in settings 
where the application of punishing stimuli to strangers was contextually rea-
sonable: a prison in the one case, and a psychology lab, mysterious to the lay 
public, in the other. Military and policing settings also include these elements. 
They also are unusual in that they are generally isolated from others, and it is 
quite possible for a person to encounter someone he or she may not know but 
who nevertheless clearly has authority over that person by virtue of superior 
rank. These contextual variables are among those that may heighten the risk 
that someone will act out of character. When warning bells start to go off that 
perhaps one is starting down a bad path, run through a mental checklist and 
consult with others to see if the situation is one like Milgram has shown can 
degrade judgment. 
There are also additional elements of potentially dangerous situations 
that go beyond those seen in the Milgram study to potentially degrade judg-
ment still further. These include personal and environmental stressors and 
the nature of the individuals with whom one is likely to come into contact. 
Milgram's subjects were stressed by the study itself and the conflicts they 
experienced, but were otherwise not subjected to external stressors. Soldiers, 
firefighters, emergency medical personnel, and police officers may, on the 
other hand, be subjected to a wide range of intense stressors that often result 
Obedience and Personal Responsibility 113 
in moral disengagement. These include the threat of injury or death, fatigue, 
sleep deprivation, lack of sanitation, exposure to temperature extremes, hun-
ger or thirst, and many others. Research has shown that many of these stress-
ors can impair specific kinds of cognitive performance, making it still more 
difficult for people to respond appropriately in difficult or confusing situations. 
The teachers in the Milgram study had no reason to harbor any animos-
ity against the learner; in fact, the learner was a particularly pleasant-seeming 
man. Soldiers and police officers are often dealing with people who actually 
want to harm them and who are far from the morally neutral actors the sub-
jects of these psychological studies encountered. For this reason, soldiers and 
police officers may again be still more susceptible to the effects of Milgram-
like conditions than were Milgram's subjects. 
Just Fix the Problems 
The following scenario is based on the kinds of events that occur daily in an 
American big-city police department. When improper or unethical behavior 
occurs, or is suspected or alleged, attention quickly turns to the question of 
responsibility: Who is to blame? In this scenario, consider the following ques-
tions: (1) Did the special operations lieutenant do anything wrong? (2) How 
would you evaluate the effectiveness of the leadership of the precinct com-
mander, special operations lieutenant, and the sergeant in charge of the field 
training officers? (3) If you were the chief of this police department, what feed-
back would you give your subordinates about this series of events? 
A local precinct commander returned from a community council meet-
ing that was well attended by influential people in the neighborhood. The 
commanding officer was asked to address a developing pattern of robber-
ies as well as conditions at a local park where day laborers had begun gath-
ering, consuming alcohol, urinating in public, and fighting with each other. 
The precinct commander calls in the special operations lieutenant, 
who is charged with handling anything in a precinct that is not addressed 
by patrol radio assignments. The precinct commander relays the events of 
the community council meeting and directs the speCial operations lieuten-
ant to "fix the problems." 
The special operations lieutenant changes the tours of the anti-crime 
team (plain clothes officers) to the hours in which the robberies are occur-
ring and moves the field training foot posts to cover pedestrian traffic 
routes. The anti -crime team and the foot posts are given the directive to 
increase Stop, Question and Frisk reports (stopping and questioning, as 
well as patting down individuals suspected of committing the robberies) 
and to increase the number of summonses issued for violations of the law. 
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The special operations lieutenant works with the anti-crime teams for one 
day and also checks the foot posts to ensure that everyone knows what is 
expected of them. 
A newly promoted sergeant and a second group of field training officers 
are given the task of policing the two parks within the precinct. On three 
separate occasions within a week, the sergeant and officers enter the park 
where the day laborers are hanging around and conduct sweeps. All per-
sons committing an infraction, violation, misdemeanor, or crime are sum-
monsed or arrested. On the last two days of the week, the sergeant and the 
group of officers go to the second park in the precinct. There, they find high 
school-age children of local residents drinking alcohol, urinating in pub-
lic, and smoking marijuana, The sergeant orders the officers to conduct the 
same sweeps as those done in the first park. The sergeant regularly reports 
to the special operations lieutenant with updates on the units' progress. 
The special operations lieutenant contacts the precinct commander 
halfway through the effort to inform him of the steps taken and the prog-
ress made. The precinct commander says he really has no time to go over 
all the details; it is the special operations lieutenant's call, backed by the 
precinct commander's support. 
At the next community council meeting, the same persons are in 
attendance. Although the robberies have stopped and arrests have been 
made, the attendees are upset with the commanding officer. The residents 
complain about being stopped, questioned, and frisked by officers, because 
they do not believe they look suspicious or fit the description of the per-
sons who had committed the robberies. They are also upset because they 
travel the same routes daily, and the police still frisk them and issue them 
additional summonses. Even more infuriated are the parents of the teen-
agers in the park. They only wanted enforcement to be conducted against 
those whom they believed were from outside of their neighborhood. The 
residents also made phone calls to the mayor's office, resulting in calls to 
the police commissioner's office. The police commissioner's office then 
called the local precinct commander to determine what enforcement activ-
ity had been conducted and its purpose. 
The precinct commander calls in the special operations lieutenant and 
berates him for the "terrible job" he had done in the precinct. He lets the 
lieutenant know in no uncertain terms that he thinks he had been over-
zealous in his planning, ineffective in his supervision, and directly respon-
sible for a major flap between the police department and neighborhood 
leaders, with whom he had been trying to cultivate better relationships for 
years, The commander orders the lieutenant to attend the next community 
council meeting and personally apologize to the community leaders. He 
also says that he intends to make sure that the lieutenant's poor job perfor-
mance is documented in his record. 
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Conflicts between obedience and personal responsibility to others, as in 
this scenario, can be difficult. The scenario also posits a conflict between obe-
dience and responsibility to oneself as well as to an organization, which is 
even more trying. People who lead in dangerous environments are often quite 
comfortable with the idea of selfless service; self-sacrifice comes with the terri-
tory. For this reason, there may be a tendency for people like the special opera-
tions lieutenant to bite the bullet and take one for the team. Is this necessarily 
what is best? 
The organizational climate in the scenario is extremely unhealthy. There 
are several features of the organization and its leadership that if unchanged 
could seemingly lead to serious ethical troubles. To begin with, the precinct 
commander failed to give the special operations lieutenant specific guidance. 
There is always a balance to be struck between micromanaging a subordi-
nate and failing to manage a subordinate, but leaders need to make sure that 
the subordinate understands his or her intent and is aware of any boundaries 
or restrictions on execution that he or she has in mind. Furthermore, if there 
are any potential pitfalls or particular ways the effort could turn out badly, the 
leader should make the subordinate aware of them. 
The precinct commander also failed to monitor execution adequately. 
When the special operations lieutenant reported to the commander after ini-
tiating the intervention, he received a lukewarm response and no face-to-face 
supervision. While leaders are always busy, there is no substitute for personal, 
hands-on involvement in day-to-day operations to ensure that policies and 
procedures are being followed, that subordinates understand what is expected 
of them, and that subordinates have the resources they need to succeed. 
Moreover, those actually doing the job are a rich source of insight about the 
approach being taken and potential improvements. By failing to engage sub-
ordinates in this way, the precinct commander may have inadvertently com-
municated that (a) the job did not matter to him all that much and (b) the 
particular approach taken was not that important. 
The precinct commander also failed to show a level of integrity and pro-
fessionalism commensurate with his position. The ultimate responsibility 
for the success or failure of the intervention must lie with the commander. 
By responding to the lieutenant's update by saying that he had his support, 
the precinct commander clearly implied that the responsibility for whatever 
happened lay at the top. When things went badly, however, the commander 
placed the blame on the lieutenant. The consequences of this unwillingness to 
accept the responsibility that comes with authority are likely to include resent-
ment, anger, and reduced creativity and risk-taking on the part of the lieuten-
ant in the future. 
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The special operations lieutenant was caught in the middle in this scenario; 
he was required to obey the precinct commander, but also had a responsibil-
ity to himself, others working on the intervention, and the organization to try 
to ensure that a good outcome for the department and the community would 
result. So who is personally responsible for the failure that occurred here? 
In the military, the commander is responsible for everything that hap-
pens or fails to happen in his or her organization, Period. Regarding the sce-
nario, the simple answer is that the precinct commander bears the primary 
responsibility for the failure, but if one assumes that this was not an isolated 
incident, and instead represents a pattern of performance that had developed 
over some time, one can begin to consider the role of organizational climate 
itself in promoting or inhibiting effective performance. 
A healthy organizational climate is one in which members are aware of 
and committed to a common, clearly articulated set of values; leaders set the 
example by demonstrating personal behaviors consistent with those values; 
members are willing and able to communicate questions and concerns to 
others in the organization; and leaders are open and responsive to concerns 
raised by members, In the scenario above, the sergeants and the special oper-
ations lieutenant have a responsibility to refuse to accept blame they do not 
think they deserve; to do otherwise does nothing to improve the organization 
and reduce the likelihood of similar occurrences in the future, Their responsi-
bility to the organization requires them to confront their immediate superior, 
and if this does not lead to a satisfactory result, to pursue the matter further, 
however uncomfortable or self-serving it may seem. Disobedience is easier 
to justify when one's actions stand to benefit someone else; by disobeying in 
these cases, the person takes the moral high ground. When disobedience--or 
something short of disobedience that questions and challenges the orders one 
is given, in hopes of changing them-might be perceived as benefiting one-
self, the person may be more reluctant to act. It is often in just such cases that 
the organization loses out, however-when individual interests trump organi-
zational obligations. 
OBEDIENCE AND PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY: 
LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT IMPLICATIONS 
Should one work to make subordinates more obedient or more responsible? 
Which is more important? One answer might be that both are important and 
that the job is to properly balance these two things. It is argued here, however, 
that given the choice between a subordinate who is always responsible and 
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one who is always obedient, one should always choose the more responsible 
person. Why? Because a subordinate who is properly responsible may some-
times be obedient and sometimes be disobedient, but will always be acting in 
the best interests of all concerned. A subordinate who is always obedient may 
or may not be acting for the common good. 
Focusing on leader and leadership development should result in the cul-
tivation of a sense of responsibility. If it is successful in building an appropri-
ate sense of personal responsibility, there will be little else required in terms of 
fostering obedience. How does one build personal responsibility? By using the 
same principles that parents might use to build personal responsibility in their 
children. One can adapt and extend the same set of tools and techniques that 
parents use to develop good citizens of the world to develop good citizens of 
an organization. In the role of leadership developer, one must do the following: 
1. Show subordinates and developing leaders that they are genuinely cared for. 
Trust and commitment are at the heart of responsibility. They cannot be 
purchased or acquired through mere exhortation. Trust and commitment 
arise when a relationship of mutual respect deepens during the course of 
repeated interactions in which each party treats the other fairly, compas-
sionately, and consistently. Trust is a tenuous construct in any relation-
ship; it develops slowly, but can be lost in a moment. 
2. Articulate and model a consistent set of values. 
Values are where accountability begins. One must be accountable to a set 
of standards; values are the basis of those standards and must be clearly 
articulated. Values are subject to discussion, even adjustment, refinement, 
or replacement, but are not negotiable. All members of an organization 
must accept the values of the group; the organization must ensure that 
values are clear and understood and that policies are consistent with 
those values, in reality as in rhetoric. 
3. Provide developmental opportunities to succeed. 
Learning takes place when actions are followed by consequences. When 
actions are followed by positive consequences, individuals recognize the 
effectiveness of their actions and are more likely to repeat them in the 
future. Leaders (and followers) learn best by doing, and the best way to 
learn to be responsible is to act responsibly and experience the positive 
feedback. 
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4. Provide opportunities to fail. 
Children who are not challenged enough in school-who are routinely 
successful at their work-may perform well but may also lack the capacity 
to stick with it when confronted with a problem they cannot immediately 
solve. Children who are challenged too much-who always confront dif-
ficult problems but rarely succeed-may develop learned helplessness; 
they may then stop trying, The best learning occurs when people are con-
fronted not only with achievable problems, but also challenging ones that 
sometimes lead to failure . Failure, if it occurs in a supportive environment, 
is an effective driver of growth. Freedom to fail is more than a slogan; it is 
an essential characteristic of a healthy environment. 
5. Set and enforce high standards and apply them transparently and universally. 
Nothing is more inimical to the development of a sense of responsibility 
among members of an organization than a perceived mismatch between 
what is said and what is done. People are exquisitely sensitive to issues 
of equity, and their willingness to hold themselves personally responsible 
for their behavior will not survive the perception that others fail to hold 
themselves to the same standards and yet escape the consequences of 
their behavior. 
6. Teach leaders to connect character to every action. 
As has been discussed, circumstances sometimes make it difficult for peo-
ple to behave as they ordinarily would. Leader developers must help sub-
ordinate leaders recognize circumstances that are likely to cause them 
to act out of character and to resist situational pressures that might lead 
them to behave in ways they might later regret. 
KEY TAKE-AWAY POINTS 
1. It is possible to be obedient but irresponsible. Being responsible some-
times means one must be disobedient. The starkest example of this is 
obeying an illegal order. Being responsible means saying, "I will not do 
that" to an illegal order, 
2. The law is on a person's side when he or she disobeys illegal orders, It 
mayor may not be when disobedience stems from judging orders to be 
immoral, insofar as that judgment goes beyond or even contradicts the 
legal obligations of respective ethical codes. 
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3. People have character, and character influences behavior over the long 
term. "Be more concerned with your character than your reputation. 
Character is what you really are. Reputation is what people say you are.,,21 
4. Situations can also influence behavior in the short run. Being able to think 
about and reflect on contextual variables affecting oneself are skills (self-
awareness and self-regulation) that can be taught and practiced. 
5. In dangerous contexts, people are more likely to encounter situational 
pressures that might influence behavior than they are in more benign 
environments. This point highlights the need to develop and practice the 
ability to be self-aware and self-regulate in more benign environments so 
these skills are practiced automatically in dangerous environments. 
6. Character can be developed and supported with the right kind of lead-
ership, mentoring, and coaching. The development must be intentional, 
planned, practiced, and modeled. 
7. Situations can be monitored and controlled to minimize negative influ-
ences. (See points three and four.) 
8. Personal responsibility cannot flourish in an organization that fails to 
make consistent demands on all its members. Consistency builds trust, 
and trust is the basis of commitment. 
9. When all is said and done, with all the research and theories about how 
and why people behave the way they do, the bottom line is that the indi-
vidual is ultimately responsible for his or her behavior. We can blame 
Mom, Dad, the weather, the dog, my boss, the cat, my best buddy, the sit-
uation, etc., but at the end of the day"the Devil did not make you do it." 
You did it yourself. 
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